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Abstract
Introducing proprietary parts to gain a competitive edge is a well-known, yet poorly
understood strategy original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) adopt. In this paper, we
consider an OEM which sells new products and competes with an independent remanufac-
turer (IR) selling remanufactured products. The OEM considers using proprietary parts to
manage the secondary market for remanufactured products. Thereby, the OEM designs its
product to balance the trade-off between the cost of proprietariness and the extra income
from selling the proprietary parts to the IR. We observe that the OEM always chooses the
smallest possible proportion of proprietary parts. This allows it to control the secondary mar-
ket without the need to overly adjust the price charged for new products. Deterring market
entry by the IR by pricing the proprietary parts prohibitively, an OEM strategy observed in
several industries, is only optimal when the willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products
is low. Otherwise, the OEM benefits more from sharing the secondary market profits with
the IR through the use of proprietary parts. Finally, we find that the OEM can also use
proprietary parts to strategically deter entry by the IR and discourage it from collecting the
cores. This can support the OEM’s decision to engage in remanufacturing even in the case
of a collection cost disadvantage. We show that – counterintuitively – the OEM may take up
remanufacturing in situations where the IR would not. While the introduction of proprietary
parts is detrimental to both IRs and consumers, OEM remanufacturing softens this loss for
the consumers.
Keywords: Proprietary parts, product remanufacturing, closed-loop supply chains.
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1 Introduction
Remanufacturing is the process whereby used products are collected and brought back to their
original cosmetic and functional conditions (Thierry et al. 1995). The remanufacturing business
is worth billions of dollars worldwide and is relevant to a considerable number of industrial sectors
(Hagerty and Glader 2011, Sundin and Dunba¨ck 2013, Stindt et al. 2017). Remanufacturing is
carried out by either the original equipment manufacturer that also builds the new product
(henceforth referred to as the OEM or ‘he’) or by independent remanufacturers (IR or ‘she’).
OEMs frequently see the existence of IRs as a menace, due to the widely accepted belief that
remanufactured products are in direct competition with their new counterparts (Guide Jr. and
Li 2010, Ferguson and Toktay 2006).
“I think that they see us as another competitor, that customers who buy refur-
bished items, they will not buy new ones” (Independent remanufacturer A, on the
relationships between OEMs and IRs).1
OEMs also believe that poorly remanufactured products can lead to brand damage (Guide Jr.
et al. 2003), and see little benefit in collaborating with IRs.
“ [...] if a customer chooses non-AirFlight2 parts, we will probably write to the
customer and say that we cannot take responsibility for the quality [of the product]”
(aerospace OEM engaged in B2B).
As a result, some OEMs, either deliberately or not, hinder the secondary market by increasing
the prices of proprietary spare parts to a point where remanufacturing becomes economically
infeasible. A part is said to be proprietary if the manufacturer holds the design rights, and
therefore exerts greater control over the marketing and sales of spare parts, and consequently,
inordinate power over the supply chain of remanufactured products. In some cases, OEMs refuse
to supply parts to non-authorized repair shops or seek legal action against anyone modifying and
repairing their products (Brandom 2015, Matchar 2016). Take Apple, for instance. In 2013, its
flagship personal computer contained proprietary hard drives, cables and even unique pentalobe
screws (McAllistair 2013). Such practices are not only applied in the electronics industry with
its short life cycles but also in automotive manufacturing (Solon 2017) and the white goods
industry as the following quote suggests:
1Unless otherwise stated, all quotes in this paper are from interviews and personal communications with the
company representatives. Further evidence on the importance of the topic is presented in Appendix B.
2fictitious name
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“I would guess over 90% of frost-free [fridges] fail because of electronics. [...] New
boards are simply too expensive as they have to be bought from the manufacturer.
The fridges are still collected and are in demand because they look modern. Who
on a low income wouldn’t want one? The vast majority go for scrap recycling”
(Independent remanufacturer B).
This quote also highlights two other aspects. First, it suggests that the use of proprietary
parts affects society in general. It limits consumer choice and contributes to the escalating
volume of products discarded every year, which could otherwise be diverted from the landfill
to the secondary market. This problem is particularly acute for certain types of waste, such
as electrical and electronic waste, which contains numerous substances that, if released to the
environment, can seriously contaminate soil and water streams, e.g., lead, cadmium, and mercury
(BBC 2002, European Comission 2018).
Second, it implies that the way proprietary parts are used may not be optimal from an
OEM’s point of view either. Specifically, it may actually reduce the profit accrued from the sale
of spare parts. There is also the possibility that it may force remanufacturers to consider other
strategies for sourcing spare parts.3 To prevent the IR from doing so, the OEM makes such
parts proprietary, which show a high failure rate.
In summary, introducing proprietary parts is a strategy OEMs can use to control the market
of used products and generate revenue from the sale of spare parts. However, it is less obvious
how it should be implemented. Thus, our first research question is:
• What is the OEM’s optimal product design and market strategy when introducing pro-
prietary parts?
Besides the question of which proportion of the product to make proprietary, the aforementi-
oned research question also captures whether the OEM should use proprietary parts to preempt
the secondary market or to extract extra profits from it.
Since the control over the secondary market through the use of proprietary parts comes at a
price, our second research question is:
• Under what conditions does the introduction of proprietary parts pay off for the OEM?
3A commonly applied approach is to scavenge parts from used units. Note, however, that, because extra cores
need to be collected and on some occasions purchased, and labor must be employed, scavenged parts are not free.
Besides this, scavenging for parts creates additional complexities and even delays in the remanufacturing process,
as remanufacturers might need to wait for similar products to the one being remanufactured to become available.
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Clearly, without proprietary parts, the OEM accepts the potential entry of an IR and conse-
quently the possible decrease in profits due to competition between the new and remanufactured
products. The OEM also foregoes revenues accrued from the sale of spare parts. Yet, these as-
pects are traded off against the design and (re-)manufacturing cost of proprietary parts.
Using proprietary parts also generates a side-effect that may be used by the OEM. Large,
multinational, OEMs often find it difficult to compete with local IRs in collecting cores. Even
without the fear of demand cannibalization, this serves as a barrier to OEM remanufacturing.
In such a context, the OEM can use proprietary parts to obtain exclusive access to the cores, by
making the secondary market unprofitable for the IR. Having removed the collection barrier, the
OEM may then find it optimal to engage in remanufacturing. This leads to our third research
question:
• Under what conditions should the OEM prefer in-house remanufacturing over IR remanu-
facturing after introducing proprietary parts?
To answer our research questions, we use a stylized model combining the new product and
proprietary parts pricing decisions of the OEM with the remanufactured product pricing deci-
sions of the IR. We model the proprietariness decision of the OEM by considering the product
design as well as (re-)manufacturing cost implications of introducing proprietary parts.
A first key insight of our analysis is that it is always optimal for the OEM to choose the
smallest possible proportion of proprietary parts for his product. This keeps the cost of pro-
prietariness down without compromising the control the OEM can exert over the secondary
market. This result also reflects and explains the observations from practice, e.g., the use of
pentalobe screws (arguably among the smallest and least expensive parts) by Apple.
A second key insight is that using proprietary parts to preempt the secondary market should
only be the preferred option when consumers’ willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products
is low. Otherwise, sales revenues from proprietary parts will outweigh the profit reduction in
the primary market due to demand cannibalization. This insight complements the existing
literature, which argues that demand cannibalization of new by remanufactured products may
be less of an issue for OEMs, by showing how extra value can be generated from the secondary
market (Atasu et al. 2010, Guide Jr. and Li 2010).
Our third key insight is that, counter to the findings from the extant literature, the OEM
may engage in remanufacturing in situations where the IR would not. Previous work has found
that the IR, which does not have a stake in the primary market, faces lower hurdles when seeking
to enter the secondary market than the OEM. The results of this paper suggest that, despite
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a collection cost disadvantage due to having less local involvement than the IR, the OEM can
benefit from easier access to cores if it discourages the IR from collecting used products by
pricing spare parts prohibitively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we place our work within
and highlight our contributions to the existing literature. Section 3 captures our base model
and analysis of the non-remanufacturing OEM, while Section 4 presents the extension focusing
on OEM remanufacturing. Finally, Section 5 concludes our paper.
2 Literature review
Remanufacturing and closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management have been extensively stu-
died in the past decades. Comprehensive literature reviews can be found in Souza (2013) and
Govindan et al. (2015). Atasu (2016) integrated the latest and most influential research in an
edited book. Our study builds on two specific streams within the CLSC literature: first, market
segmentation and competition between new and remanufactured products, and second, product
design.
2.1 Market segmentation and competition in CLSCs
Market segmentation and competition have been recognized as essential strands of research on
CLSCs. Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) and Ferrer and Swaminathan (2010) addressed the
competition between an OEM and an IR and considered the volume of returns as, respectively,
a fraction of the products sold (and therefore an exogenous variable) and as having a linear
relationship with effort. Atasu et al. (2008) proposed an alternative approach to modeling com-
petition, and contributed to prior research by incorporating green segments, incorporating OEM
competition, and examining product life-cycle effects, while O¨rsdemir et al. (2014) considered
the impact that quality has on the competition between the OEM and the IR. Heese et al. (2005)
studied the case of an OEM both manufacturing and remanufacturing products (i.e., hospital
beds) and competing with another OEM.
More recently, others have examined the competition in the primary market, and how it
affects the collection strategy. Jena and Sarmah (2014) considered the case of two OEMs com-
peting in both the primary and secondary markets. Wu and Zhou (2017) extended the work of
Savaskan et al. (2004) by examining the effect of competition in the primary market (the market
for new products) on product recovery decisions.
Some papers have explicitly addressed the strategies OEMs use to control the secondary
5
market. For example, Ferguson and Toktay (2006) studied an OEM preemptively collecting
cores without actually remanufacturing them. Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) studied relicensing of
software in the IT sector as a means to benefit from the secondary market, as consumers buying
refurbished hardware from an IR have to buy a license from the OEM in addition. Finally, Hong
et al. (2017) considered competitive settings in which the IR had to buy the remanufacturing
license from the OEM. They analyzed different types of licensing agreements between the OEM
and IR.
Essentially, this stream of literature examines how OEMs compete with IRs and other OEMs
and focuses mostly on pricing decisions. Moreover, it is usually assumed that technology and
product design are exogenously given and do not change during the decision horizon. The
last two papers, Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) and Hong et al. (2017), come closest to our setting in
studying a mechanism through which the OEM can benefit from the secondary market. However,
in both papers, it is assumed that the product design is fixed and the licensing does not incur any
cost for the OEM. Moreover, in Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) the licensing interaction takes place
between the OEM and the consumer directly, while in our model, like in Hong et al. (2017), the
proprietary parts (license) have to be bought by the IR.
2.2 Product design
Product design has different dimensions, and several of them have been studied in the past in
the context of CLSCs. A stream of literature focuses on demand-inducing product design and its
interaction with used-product recovery. Atasu and Souza (2013) investigated how product reuse
impacts product quality choice and found that recovery may lead to higher product quality.
They also showed how the form of product recovery, recovery cost structure and product take-
back legislation affects a firm’s quality choice. O¨rsdemir et al. (2014) extended Atasu and Souza
(2013) to the oligopoly setting and studied the competitive quality choice in the presence of
remanufacturing. They found that, when an OEM competes with an IR, remanufacturing may
reduce quality and increase environmental impact.
Another sub-field of research examines design choices affecting remanufacturability and cost
of remanufacturing. Debo et al. (2005) studied the joint pricing and remanufacturability decision
faced by a manufacturer introducing a remanufacturable product. If a firm can decide on product
quality and remanufacturability levels, it will couple increased remanufacturing with higher
product quality, as shown in Gu et al. (2015). Wu (2012) studied the design-for-disassembly
problem in a supply chain formed by an OEM producing only new products and an IR. Using a
two-period model, the author finds that the optimal level of disassemblability crucially depends
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on the recovery costs of the used products. When recovery costs are low, the OEM chooses low
levels of disassemblability to discourage competition from the IR. These papers are related to our
setting in that the introduction of proprietary parts by the OEM also affects the remanufacturing
cost for the IR. However, in none of these papers does the design decision yield direct benefits
for the OEM in the secondary market.
2.3 Summary of our work’s contributions to this literature
Our paper builds on and contributes to these two streams of research within the CLSC field in
two ways. First, by considering the use of proprietary parts which – unlike software licenses –
impose a cost on the OEM both in their design and their embedding in new (and remanufac-
tured) products, we model different market environments (e.g., white goods, cell phones, heavy
machinery). We also contribute to the understanding of an OEM’s optimal decision under the
presence of such a costly action being required to control the secondary market. Both OEM
and IR, in this case, adopt a coopetition strategy, where the IR is managed as both competitor
and buyer. Second, we enrich the product design literature by introducing the optimal decision
regarding the proportion of proprietary parts to include in a new product. This decision essenti-
ally complements our understanding of the mechanisms manipulating the remanufacturing cost.
Unlike the papers focusing on remanufacturability or design-for-disassembly, we model a setting
where the design choice, the proportion of proprietary parts, is used by the OEM in such a way
that it benefits directly from IR remanufacturing.
3 The case of a non-remanufacturing OEM
To study the questions posed in the introduction we use a stylized model of an OEM offering
new products only and an IR which may compete with the OEM by remanufacturing used
products. The environment in which both competitors operate is described in Section 3.1.
Then, we reconsider the pure price competition solution (as in, e.g., Ferguson and Toktay 2006)
in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we show how the OEM competes with the IR when he also gets
to choose the proprietary fraction of the new product, and compare this solution with the pure
price competition case. Finally, in a numerical study put forth in Section 3.4, we quantify the
economic impact of using proprietary parts for a broad set of possible scenarios.
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3.1 Model description
Setting. Since our focus is on the competition between the OEM and the IR, we assume – in
line with prior research – a monopolist OEM in the market for new products (Savaskan et al.
2004, Atasu et al. 2013, De Giovanni and Zaccour 2014). We assume a mature market and thus
consider a single period in a steady-state setting, where a period corresponds to the usage period
of the product (Agrawal et al. 2015). At the end of the period, a fraction γ of the new units
sold at a per-unit price pn becomes available for collection and subsequent remanufacturing, as
in Esenduran et al. (2017) and Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006).
We also assume, as a starting point, that the OEM is currently not engaged in remanufac-
turing his end-of-use products. Reasons for that could be resource-based, such as the absence
of a logistical collection network (Stindt et al. 2017), or demand-based, such as fear of canni-
balization of new product sales (Guide Jr. and Li 2010). While the OEM does not collect and
remanufacture himself, he recognizes the threat of an IR entering the secondary market.
In light of that threat, the OEM considers (re-)designing his products using proprietary
parts. Being proprietary, these parts can only be purchased from the OEM, which sells them
at a markup. To become a competitive lever, the OEM chooses such parts to be proprietary
which show a high failure rate (see quote from IR B in the introduction). In order to focus
on the OEM’s spare-parts decision, we assume the failure rate to be one. Thus, the IR cannot
scavenge collected cores for those parts. There is no such restriction for non-proprietary parts,
which are procured from the market. The OEM, therefore, exerts control over the profitability
of the secondary market.
OEM decision and cost. The OEM decides on the optimal proprietary content β of his
product’s unit cost, where βmin ≤ β ≤ 1. The minimum fraction βmin of the product that needs
to be made proprietary is an industry-specific parameter. Introducing proprietary parts causes
a fixed design cost and, depending on the proprietary content, it increases the marginal cost of
both producing new products and proprietary spare parts. Regarding design cost, we assume the
general form ξβν , where ξ denotes the design cost factor for making proprietary content and ν
relates to design efficiency. A value of ν = 0 would model a fixed design cost independent of the
proportion of proprietary content and ν > 0 would mimic variable design cost, with increasing
ν implying a less efficient design.
Unit production cost, cn, linearly increases in the proprietary content, i.e.
cn = β(1 + ψ)c+ (1− β)c = (1 + βψ)c, (1)
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where c is the unit cost of a completely non-proprietary product, and ψ is the percentage cost
increase for a fully proprietary product. Analogously, the unit production cost of proprietary
spare parts, cp, is
cp = β(1 + ψ)c. (2)
IR decision and cost. The OEM sets a per-unit wholesale price ws ≥ cp that he charges the
IR for the proprietary portion β of the product provided as a spare part. For the remaining
portion of the product, 1− β, we assume that there is a cost advantage of remanufacturing over
new production, 0 < φ < 1. Consequently, the unit remanufacturing cost for the IR, cr, becomes
cr = ws + (1− β)φc, (3)
being larger than the effective remanufacturing cost (without a markup), c˜, which would be
c˜ = β(1 + ψ)c+ (1− β)φc. (4)
In line with Atasu et al. (2013), the IR faces convex collection cost ccq
2
r for the used products,
where qr is the collection quantity. Note that the IR would never collect more than she wished
to remanufacture. Thus, qr is also the number of remanufactured units offered to the secondary
market at price pr.
Consumer behavior. To finalize the description of our model, we need to characterize how
the prices for new and remanufactured products, pn and pr, respectively, will shape the demand
in the primary and secondary markets. Here, we follow the utility-based approach (see, e.g.,
Debo et al. 2005, Oraiopoulos et al. 2012, Souza 2013), which assumes that the willingness-to-pay
for the new product is distributed uniformly in the interval [0, 1], and that all consumers show
a lower willingness-to-pay for the remanufactured product, reflected by a commonly applied
discount factor δ < 1 (WTP discount factor). Normalizing the market size to one, this yields
linear demand functions as follows:
qn(pn, pr) = 1− pn − pr
1− δ and qr(pn, pr) =
δpn − pr
δ(1− δ) . (5)
Figure 1 illustrates the basic structure of our model. For ease of reference, Table 1 summarizes
our notation.
In the considered Stackelberg setting with the OEM as a leader, the timeline of the decisions
is given by the following steps4:
4To test the robustness of our results with respect to the competitive setting we also considered two alternative
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Figure 1: Model structure with proprietary parts
Table 1: Summary of model notation
Parameters:
0 < βmin ≤ 1 Minimum proprietary content of product’s unit cost
0 < c < 1 Marginal cost of a new product without proprietary content (β = 0)
0 ≤ ψ Marginal cost increase induced by a fully proprietary product (β = 1)
0 < φ < 1 Cost advantage due to remanufacturing
0 < cc IR’s cost of collecting a used product
0 < δ < 1 WTP discount factor for remanufactured products
0 < γ ≤ 1 Core collection yield factor, fraction of used products that is collectable
0 < ξ OEM’s design cost factor for making proprietary content
0 < ν OEM’s design efficiency
Decision variables:
β Proportion of product’s unit cost that is proprietary (OEM)
ws Wholesale price of (proprietary content) spare parts (OEM)
pn Sales price of new products (OEM)
pr Sales price of remanufactured products (IR)
Auxiliary variables:
qn Sales quantity of new products
qr Sales quantity of remanufactured products
c˜ Effective remanufacturing cost
1. Initially, the OEM decides on the proprietary content β of the product.
2. Then the OEM decides on the wholesale price for proprietary spare parts ws as well as on
the price for the new product pn.
3. Finally, the IR decides on the price of the remanufactured product pr.
model variants. The first one kept the Stackelberg structure and replaced the market price competition with
quantity competition, i.e. the OEM sets qn while the IR sets qr. The second one assumed that market prices were
determined simultaneously by the OEM and the IR. We modeled this as a Nash game. It turned out that the
main structural insights were unchanged. The results are provided in Appendix D.
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The equilibrium of this model and all considered variants are derived through backward in-
duction.
3.2 Benchmark: Selling the product with generic parts
Before we look at the proprietariness decision of the OEM, let us first consider a situation
without proprietary parts. In that case, the production cost is cn = c and the remanufacturing
cost becomes cr = φc due to the fully generic content of the product. The profit functions of
the OEM and the IR in the considered Stackelberg game with the OEM as leader are
max
pn
ΠOEMgen (pn|pr) = (pn − c)qn s.t. 0 ≤ qn, (6)
max
pr
ΠIRgen(pr|pn) = (pr − φc− ccqr)qr s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ γqn. (7)
Besides non-negativity constraints on all quantities, the IR faces the core availability constraint
qr ≤ γqn. The following lemma characterizes the different equilibrium strategy regions when
there are no proprietary parts.
Lemma 1. For the case in which proprietary parts are not used, the characteristics of the
equilibrium regions are provided in Table 2. There exists a threshold value for the core collection
yield factor, γˆ, and two threshold values for the marginal cost of a new product cˆ1 and cˆ2 (for
functional forms see the proof in Appendix A). The equilibrium regions can be described as
follows:
No remanufacturing If δ ≤ φ and c ≥ cˆ1, the IR does not enter the market, i.e., qr = 0.
Partial remanufacturing If (δ ≤ φ and cˆ1 > c > cˆ2) OR (δ > φ and γ ≥ γˆ and c < cˆ2), the
IR enters the market but does not remanufacture all available cores, i.e., 0 < qr < γqn.
Full remanufacturing If (δ ≤ φ and cˆ2 ≥ c) OR (δ > φ and γ ≥ γˆ and c ≥ cˆ2) OR (δ > φ
and γ < γˆ), the IR enters the market and remanufactures all available cores, i.e., qr = γqn.
Figure 2 illustrates the strategy space for the two cases in which the core collection yield
factor, γ, is larger and respectively smaller than the threshold γˆ. In the case of pure price
competition, the OEM reacts to the entry threat – even if the IR does not enter the market –
by reducing the price of new products (compared with a monopoly market price pn =
1+c
2 , see
Atasu et al. 2008) and giving up some profit.
3.3 Selling the product with proprietary parts
Above we have seen that – despite deviating from the monopoly market price – the OEM can
deter entry by the IR for a limited range of situations in which the attractiveness of remanu-
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Table 2: Equilibrium prices and quantities when there are no proprietary parts
Strategy No Partial Full
region remanufacturing remanufacturing remanufacturing
pn
1+c
2 − δ
2(1−c)
8cc+8δ−6δ2
1+c
2 − δ(δ−cφ)4cc+4δ−2δ2 1+c2 −
δ(δ+γ(δ(2−δ)+2cc))(1−c)
8cc+8δ−6δ2+γδ(4cc+4δ−2δ2)
pr n.a. δ
1+c
2 − δ(δ−cφ)4cc+4δ−2δ2 −
δ(1−δ)(δ−φ)c
4cc+4δ−4δ2 δpn −
2δ(1−δ)γ(δ(2−δ)+2cc)(1−c)
8cc+8δ−6δ2+γδ(4cc+4δ−2δ2)
qn
1−c
2 +
δ2(1−c)
8cc+8δ−6δ2
1−c
2 − δ(δ−φ)c4cc+4δ−4δ2 1−c2 +
δ(δ−γ(δ(2−δ)+2cc))(1−c)
8cc+8δ−6δ2+γδ(4cc+4δ−2δ2)
qr 0
δ−cφ
4cc+4δ−2δ2 +
(δ−φ)c
4cc+4δ−4δ2 γqn
0  1
0
c1

1
c2


c
no remanufacturing
by IR
partial
remanufacturing
by IR
full remanufacturing
by IR
0  1
0
c1

1
c2


c
no remanufacturing
by IR
partial remanufacturing
by IR
full remanufacturing
by IR
Figure 2: Characterization of the strategy regions when the OEM does not use proprietary parts
for γ < γˆ (left) and γ ≥ γˆ (right)
factured products is low (δ is small) and production costs c are high. Thus, we now study how
introducing proprietary parts affects the competitive environment.
Given a proprietary content β, the manufacturer and the IR solve a price game as follows:
max
pn,ws
ΠOEMprop (pn, ws|pr) = (pn − cn)qn + (ws − cp)qr − ξβν s.t. 0 ≤ qn, (8)
max
pr
ΠIRprop(pr|pn, ws) = (pr − cr − ccqr)qr s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ γqn. (9)
In the next step, the OEM decides on the optimal proprietariness fraction β∗ by solving
max
β
ΠOEMprop (β|p∗n, w∗s , p∗r) s.t. β ≥ βmin. (10)
Note that, by model design, the unit production cost of a new product must not exceed an upper
bound, cmax, which corresponds to the proprietary content β, i.e., c < cmax =
1
1+βψ . Otherwise,
introducing proprietary content at level β would render new production non-profitable.
The following lemma characterizes the different strategy regions in the equilibrium.
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0  c
˜
cn
1
0
cmax
1
c1

c
no remanufacturing
by IR
partial remanufacturing
by IR
full remanufacturing
by IR
0
Figure 3: Characterization of the strategy regions in the case of an OEM using proprietary parts
Lemma 2. Characteristics of the equilibrium regions for a fixed value of β are given in Table 3.
Given new production is profitable using proprietary parts (c < cmax), there exists a threshold
value for the marginal production cost of a new product, c¯1 (for the functional form see the proof
in Appendix A), and the equilibrium regions can be described as follows:
No remanufacturing If δ < c˜cn , the IR does not enter the market and the OEM acts as a
monopolist, i.e., qr = 0.
Partial remanufacturing If δ ≥ c˜cn and c < c¯1, the IR enters the market but does not rema-
nufacture all available cores, i.e., 0 < qr < γqn.
Full remanufacturing If δ ≥ c˜cn and c ≥ c¯1, the IR enters the market and remanufactures all
available cores, i.e., qr = γqn.
Table 3: Equilibrium prices and quantities in all three strategy regions
Strategy No Partial Full
region remanufacturing remanufacturing remanufacturing
ws ≥ cp + δ(1−cn)2 cp + δ−c˜2 cp + (δ+2ccγ+(2−δ)δγ)(1−cn)2(1+δγ)
pn
1+cn
2
1+cn
2
1+cn
2
pr n.a. δpn − δ(1−δ)(δcn−c˜)4(cc+δ(1−δ)) δpn −
γδ(1−δ)(1−cn)
2(1+δγ)
qn
1−cn
2
1−cn
2 − δ(δcn−c˜)4(cc+δ(1−δ)) 1−cn2 −
γδ(1−cn)
2(1+δγ)
qr 0
δcn−c˜
4(cc+δ(1−δ)) γqn
Figure 3 shows the strategy space for given proprietary content β. Note that region 0 depicts
the disregarded case where new production is not viable. Using the results from Lemma 2, we
can now turn to the optimal level of β.
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Proposition 1. When designing a product with the use of proprietary parts, the OEM will
always choose minimum proprietary content, i.e. β∗ = βmin. The OEM will deter market entry
by the IR, setting the spare parts price ws such that δcn < c˜, if βmin >
δ−φ
1−φ+(1−δ)ψ .
This result is in line with empirical and anecdotal evidence (e.g. the pentalobe screws from
Apple (McAllistair 2013), for more on which see Appendix B). Making a small (the smallest pos-
sible) portion of the product proprietary minimizes the associated design and (re-)manufacturing
cost and suffices to give the OEM control over the secondary market. Specifically, when the at-
tractiveness of the secondary market is sufficiently high (i.e. δ is large), it is optimal for the OEM
to let the IR enter. Under the optimal choice of the wholesale price ws (as shown in Table 3),
the OEM’s extra profits due to spare parts sales outweigh the reduced profits on the primary
market caused by a reduction in the sales of new products. Thus, although the OEM could
deter entry by the IR, it is only optimal for him to do so when the secondary market is not very
profitable or the required minimum proprietary fraction is too large.
Moreover, comparing Table 3 with Table 2 reveals another interesting result. Without pro-
prietary parts, the OEM lowers its price pn – taking the market conditions into account – to
establish a more hostile environment for the IR. Conversely, when introducing proprietary parts,
the OEM controls competition without the need to change the market price for new products
pn.
5 Thus, the OEM asserts control over the secondary market entirely via the wholesale price
charged for the proprietary parts.
The decision of whether or not to introduce proprietary parts, and thereby how best to deter
market entry by the IR, crucially depends on the design cost of introducing proprietary parts.
From Lemma 1 and Figure 2 we observe that the IR does not enter the secondary market when
there are no proprietary parts for small WTP discount factor, δ, and high new product unit cost,
c. In that case, it would seem that introducing proprietary parts cannot make sense. However,
Proposition 2 provides a condition under which the OEM is better off by introducing proprietary
parts.
Proposition 2. Assume that under zero proprietariness it is optimal for the IR not to enter
the market. In that case, the OEM still prefers to introduce proprietary parts when
ξβνmin <
1
4
[
δ4(1− c)2
(4cc + 4δ − 3δ2)2 − 2(1− c)cψβmin + c
2ψ2β2min
]
. (11)
Thus, the OEM may benefit from introducing proprietary parts and pricing them prohibiti-
vely high in order not to sell them to the IR. Thereby, the OEM deters entry without experiencing
5Note that, if a monopoly were guaranteed, the OEM would always choose β = 0 and consequently unit cost
cn = c.
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a loss in profit due to the strategic reduction in the price for the new product, pn.
As already discussed above, the price pn is always larger – and quantity qn is smaller – under
the use of proprietary parts than without proprietary parts. The condition given in Proposition
2 provides an upper bound on the fixed design cost ξβνmin that guarantees that the associated
extra primary market profit outweighs the cost of introducing proprietariness.
3.4 Numerical analysis
To explicitly quantify the economic differences between the use and lack of use of proprietary
parts by the OEM, we now present the results of a comprehensive numerical analysis. After
introducing the experimental design, we focus on the OEM’s profitability and decision making
but also briefly highlight the implications for the IR and the consumers.
3.4.1 Experimental design
To capture the widest possible set of industry scenarios, we employ a full-factorial experimental
design. For each relevant parameter, we consider two values, a high one and a low one. These
values are shown in Table 4 and were chosen in line with previous work on remanufacturing
(Subramanian and Subramanyam 2012, Guide Jr. et al. 2006, Ferguson et al. 2006, 2011). The
values of βmin and ψ were estimated on the basis of interviews with company representatives from
both computer and white-goods OEMs. For design efficiency, controlled by ν, we consider two
special but realistic cases. The first one (ν = 0) reflects a fixed design cost which is independent
of the proportion of proprietary content in the final product. The second one (ν = 2) represents
quadratic cost, which models the increasing difficulty of making a larger proportion of the
product proprietary. Finally, the values of ξ have been chosen such that all strategy regions are
relevant. Overall, we obtain 512 instances (9 parameters with 2 realizations each, i.e. 29 = 512).
Table 4: Experimental design
Parameter βmin c ψ φ cc δ γ ξ ν
Low 0.1 0.2 0 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.0001 0
High 0.3 0.6 0.25 0.7 0.3 0.85 0.7 0.001 2
The full set of results can be obtained from the authors. Here, for the sake of brevity, we
focus on the most relevant, aggregated results.
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Figure 4: Violin plot of relative OEM profit changes (ΠOEMprop −ΠOEMgen )/ΠOEMgen
Table 5: Distribution of instances (left panel) and average relative OEM profit changes (ΠOEMprop −
ΠOEMgen )/Π
OEM
gen (right panel)
# of instances
Model gen
no reman reman
Model
prop
no reman 64 128
reman 0 320
ΠOEMprop −ΠOEMgen
ΠOEMgen
Model gen
no reman reman
Model
prop
no reman -6% 21%
reman – 81%
3.4.2 Profit and decision making impact on the OEM
We first consider the profit impact on the OEM of using proprietary parts. On average, over all
the 512 instances, the OEM gains 55% (computed as
ΠOEMprop −ΠOEMgen
ΠOEMgen
) by using proprietary parts.
The violin plot in Figure 4 presents the distribution of percentage changes in OEM profit when
introducing proprietary parts.
This result supports the widespread use of proprietary parts in practice. To get a deeper
insight, we take a more granular look at our results. Specifically, for each model we distinguish
between the cases with (qr > 0) and without (qr = 0) remanufacturing. Tables 5 and 6 provide
the results for each of the resulting four strategy combinations.
The left panel of Table 5, showing the prevalence of each combination, confirms that we can
never have a situation where there is remanufacturing under the use of proprietary parts but no
remanufacturing without proprietary parts. In 25% of the cases, the OEM deters entry by the
IR through using proprietary parts when otherwise the IR would enter and sell remanufactured
cores. However, in the majority of cases, it is optimal to let the IR enter regardless of whether
or not proprietary parts are used.
The right panel of Table 5 provides the profit implications of using proprietary parts (com-
pared to not using them) for these different strategy combinations. Clearly, profit differences
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Table 6: Average relative price changes (left panel) and quantity changes (right panel)
pn,prop−pn,gen
pn,gen
(
pr,prop−pr,gen
pr,gen
)
Model gen
no reman reman
Model
prop
no reman 4% (–) 14% (–)
reman – (–) 30% (37%)
qn,prop−qn,gen
qn,gen
(
qr,prop−qr,gen
qr,gen
)
Model gen
no reman reman
Model
prop
no reman -15% (–) -4% (-100%)
reman – (–) -19% (-64%)
are more pronounced when it is optimal for the OEM, which introduces proprietary parts, to let
the IR enter the secondary market. Here the OEM capitalizes on profitably selling proprietary
parts and thereby sharing the revenues in the secondary market with the IR. This is also shown
by the results in Table 6, where we present the average price and quantity changes in both the
primary and the secondary market (where applicable). Clearly, in the scenarios where the IR
enters regardless of the OEM’s strategy, the introduction of proprietary parts allows the OEM
to charge a 30% higher price for new products while only facing a 19% reduction in quantity.
Thus, the OEM not only benefits from the secondary market but also observes increased primary
market profits.
We also observe that, on average, the OEM is worse off if he introduces proprietary parts
in the environment underlying Proposition 2. In those cases, the average profit change is -6%
as shown in the right panel of Table 5. Disaggregating the results reveals a small number of
cases supporting the finding from Proposition 2 with a maximum profit change of 2%. However,
particularly when c is large and δ is small, the profit decrease associated with introducing
proprietary parts can be as large as 23%. A high c implies that the primary market and the
associated profits are small, while a small δ implies that the secondary market is not very
attractive. Jointly, these market characteristics make the investment in proprietary parts costly
(regarding primary market profits) but scarcely effective (in terms of gains from preempting the
secondary market).
Summarizing, our results suggest that using proprietary parts to preempt the secondary
market is the preferred option for the OEM only in a minority of possible environments. In most
of the considered scenarios, the OEM benefits more from strategically using these proprietary
parts to skim some profits from the secondary market without getting directly involved in the
reverse supply chain. Yet, our empirical and anecdotal evidence from various IRs suggests that,
currently, OEMs often fail to tap that potential, hurting both the IR and also themselves.
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Table 7: Average relative IR profit changes (ΠIRprop −ΠIRgen)/ΠIRgen and consumer surplus changes
(Υprop −Υgen)/Υgen (in brackets)
Model gen
no reman reman
Model
prop
no reman – (-27%) -100% (-36%)
reman – -93% (-54%)
3.4.3 Impact on the IR and consumer surplus
To conclude this section let us briefly highlight and discuss the effect of the strategy adopted by
the OEM on the IR’s profit as well as on consumer surplus. In line with the assumptions made for
deriving demand functions (5), we define the consumer surplus Υ to be the cumulative difference
between a consumer’s willingness to pay for the chosen product (new or remanufactured) and
the corresponding price, which calculates as follows (for a derivation see Appendix C)
Υ = qn
(
1− pn − qn
2
)
+
δq2r
2
(12)
Table 7 shows the average relative changes in IR profits and consumer surplus (in brackets).
As expected, both IR and consumers are worse off when the OEM introduces proprietary parts.
Interestingly, the OEM can essentially extract all the extra profits from the secondary market
when introducing proprietary parts and letting the IR enter. Also, consumer surplus takes the
largest dip in those cases. The reason for this is the significant price increase on both the
primary and secondary markets and the associated massive drop in remanufactured product
sales (compare Table 6).
4 Remanufacturing by the OEM
Above we have considered the case of a non-remanufacturing OEM. As mentioned in Section
3.1, the reasons for not remanufacturing come from two categories, namely, demand-based and
resource-based issues. On the demand side, cannibalization of new product sales critically im-
pacts the OEM’s decision not to sell remanufactured products. However, this opens the door
for IRs, which are not worried about primary market profits. In our analysis so far, we have
seen how the non-remanufacturing OEM combines proprietary parts and an appropriate pricing
strategy to counter the entry threat from an IR. We have found that, although the OEM could
always deter market entry by the IR through prohibitive pricing, this is only optimal when
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δcn < c˜. Otherwise, the OEM benefits more from letting the IR enter and sharing the secondary
market profits. In those cases, a market expansion effect outweighs the cannibalization, and
demand-side drivers for not remanufacturing do not seem to be prevalent.
Yet, there may still be resource-based obstacles, including the lack of remanufacturing ca-
pabilities as well as the difficulty of accessing cores. While the former hurdle is internal to the
OEM, the latter relates to competition with a more locally operating IR that may be able to
collect cores more efficiently. In this case, the OEM may be reluctant to develop its internal
remanufacturing skills. However, if the OEM could more easily access the cores, he might con-
sider remanufacturing more favorably. Proprietary parts can play a role in solving this issue,
since pricing these parts to deter market entry also removes the IR’s incentive to collect co-
res. Thus, the OEM may gain exclusive access to used products and might decide to perform
remanufacturing himself. In what follows, we analyze this scenario in more detail.
For parsimony (w.l.o.g.), we consider the same demand functions (5) as in the IR rema-
nufacturing case by assuming that the valuation of the products does not depend on whether
the OEM or the IR remanufactures. Keeping the basic cost structure from the case of a non-
remanufacturing OEM (see Section 3.3), the OEM’s cost of remanufacturing a product with β
proprietary content is proportional to the production cost and given by
cOEMr = φ[βc(1 + ψ) + (1− β)c] = φc(1 + βψ) = φcn. (13)
Since OEMs are typically large multinational companies, having to collect across long distan-
ces, and IRs are (relatively) small local firms, we assume that the OEM faces a higher collection
effort. This is modeled by applying a factor α > 1 to the collection cost, which represents the
collection cost disadvantage.
Under these conditions, the OEM’s objective function becomes
ΠOEMprop+rem(pn) = (pn − cn)qn + (pr − cOEMr − αccqr)qr − ξβν . (14)
Again, the core availability constraint qr ≤ γqn as well as β ≥ βmin have to hold. Analogously
to the result in Proposition 1, it is easy to observe that, in the optimal solution, β = βmin holds.
Lemma 3. Characteristics of the equilibrium regions in the case of OEM remanufacturing are
given in Table 8. Given new production is profitable using proprietary parts, there exists a
threshold value for the marginal production cost of a new product, c¯2, and the equilibrium regions
can be described as follows:
No OEM remanufacturing If δ ≤ φ, the OEM does not remanufacture, i.e., qr = 0.
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Table 8: Structure of optimal solution in case of OEM remanufacturing
Strategy No OEM Partial OEM Full OEM
region remanufacturing remanufacturing remanufacturing
pn
1+cn
2
1+cn
2
1+cn
2
−γ((δ−φ)cn+γ(αcc+(1−φ)δ)cn−γ(αcc+δ(1−δ)))
2(1+2δγ+(αcc+δ)γ2)
pr n.a. δpn − δ(1−δ)(δ−φ)cn2(αcc+δ(1−δ)) δpn −
δ(1−δ)γ(1−cn+γ(δ−φcn))
2(1+2δγ+(αcc+δ)γ2)
qn
1−cn
2
1−cn
2 − δ(δ−φ)cn2(αcc+δ(1−δ))
1−cn+γ(δ−φcn)
2(1+2δγ+(αcc+δ)γ2)
qr 0
(δ−φ)cn
2(αcc+δ(1−δ)) γqn
0  1
0
cmax
1
c2

c
no remanufacturing
by OEM
partial remanufacturing
by OEM
full remanufacturing
by OEM
0
Figure 5: Strategy space in case of OEM remanufacturing
Partial OEM remanufacturing If δ > φ and c < c¯2, the OEM remanufactures some cores,
i.e., 0 < qr < γqn.
Full OEM remanufacturing If δ > φ and c ≥ c¯2, the OEM remanufactures all available cores,
i.e., qr = γqn.
Figure 5 illustrates the structural properties of the optimal solution. Comparing Figures 3
and 5 we can observe an interesting result which is summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. When the OEM decides to introduce proprietary parts and consequently sets
β∗ = βmin, his optimal secondary market policy is to deter entry by the IR but to remanufacture
himself when φ < δ ≤ δ¯ = c˜cn .
Note that this result is counter to the extant finding in the literature (see, e.g., Ferguson
and Toktay 2006), according to which the OEM has less inclination to remanufacture than an
IR, since he takes into account not only the potential extra profit in the secondary market but
also the profit decline in the primary market. Thus, the IR that just needs to consider the
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Table 9: Distribution of instances (left panel) and average relative OEM profit changes
(ΠOEMprop+rem −ΠOEMprop )/ΠOEMprop (right panel)
# of instances
Model prop+rem
no reman reman
Model
prop
no reman 128 64
reman 0 320
ΠOEMprop+rem−ΠOEMprop
ΠOEMprop
Model prop+rem
no reman reman
Model
prop
no reman 0% 8%
reman – 13%
secondary market effect, which is strictly positive for her, will enter the market under conditions
in which the OEM prefers to sell only new products. Proposition 3 reveals conditions under
which – despite the IR collection cost advantage – the OEM remanufactures even though the
IR is deterred from entering the market. This result is driven by the cost advantage of the
OEM, induced by being the only one able to remanufacture the proprietary parts. Thus, here,
the proprietary parts serve an additional purpose. Using those parts, the OEM discourages
the IR from collecting cores, thereby gaining exclusive access to the cores. Then, the OEM
remanufactures these cores, capitalizing on a market expansion effect that outweighs the demand
cannibalization effect.
Using the same experimental setup as in the previous section, we now present insights from
our numerical analysis to show the emergence and magnitude of the profit increase due to
the OEM’s own remanufacturing compared to the IR’s remanufacturing, in the case of entry
deterrence through prohibitive pricing of the proprietary parts. Regarding the collection cost
disadvantage of the OEM, we assume that α = 2, i.e., the costs are twice as high as those the
IR would face. The aggregated results are shown in Tables 9 and 10. We observe that, despite
the significant collection cost disadvantage, the OEM on average receives an extra profit of more
than 10% when strategically using proprietary parts to gain exclusive access to the cores as well
as remanufacturing and selling them himself in comparison to the case where he lets the IR
remanufacture. We also find that the setting described in Proposition 3 occurs in more than
12% of the cases and the average profit increase in those cases is still 8%.
As the OEM’s remanufacturing removes the double marginalization problem arising when
the IR remanufactures, this also makes the consumers better off by roughly the same percentage
as shown in Table 10. However, these benefits do not outweigh the losses faced by the consumers
due to the introduction of proprietary parts (compare Table 7). Thus, overall, the OEM benefits
from using proprietary spare parts (and remanufacturing them himself), while both the IR and
the consumers lose.
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Table 10: Average relative consumer surplus change (Υprop+rem −Υprop)/Υprop
Model prop+rem
no reman reman
Model
prop
no reman 0% 5%
reman – 12%
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the competition between an OEM and an IR, where the OEM stra-
tegically adopts proprietary parts as a means to obtain a competitive edge over the IR, and to
exert greater control over the secondary market for remanufactured products. This study was
inspired by various first-hand accounts and cases reported in the media of such a strategy.
We contribute to the existing literature by developing a framework for strategic decision
making concerning pricing (i.e., pricing of new and remanufactured products) and the use of
proprietary parts. Our findings imply that it is always optimal for the OEM to choose the
smallest possible fraction of proprietariness. This enables the OEM to control the secondary
market sufficiently, while keeping the design and (re-)manufacturing costs low. Moreover, by
appropriately pricing the proprietary parts, governance of the secondary market is possible for
the OEM without the need to manipulate the price of the new products. Another insight is that
the use of proprietary parts as a strategy to starve the secondary market is only suitable for the
OEM when the willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products is low. This helps to explain the
prevalence of such a strategy in the white-goods industry, particularly for washing machines, as
indicated by the accounts we obtained from IRs in that industry.
Further, we find that the OEM benefits from easier access to cores. Global OEMs may find
it difficult to compete with local IRs in collecting cores. Here, the use of proprietary parts and
a prohibitive pricing strategy not only deters remanufacturing by the IR but also discourages
collection of cores, giving the OEM exclusive access. This effect can lead to situations where –
counter to findings in the existing literature – the OEM may find it optimal to remanufacture
when the IR will not do so. While this result depends on the relative collection cost of the OEM
compared to the IR, we find that, even under a twofold increase in the collection cost, the OEM
can extract a significant extra profit with this strategy.
The insights of this paper are also relevant to IRs and policymakers. We demonstrate that
even small changes in product design in the direction of making the product more proprietary
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can lead to the collapse of the secondary market, and have severe consequences for the IR
and the consumers. We observe that IRs might even be pushed out of the secondary market
completely. Moreover, consumer surplus decreases when proprietary parts are adopted. Yet,
OEM remanufacturing softens this loss, at least for consumers. Thus, any initiatives targeting
standardization should be scrutinized by policymakers to ensure an overall benefit to the various
stakeholders.
For future research, we encourage the examination of the scenario in which cores can be
scavenged for parts by the IR. Since parts scavenged from cores by the IR reduce the volume
of spare parts the OEM can sell, it should be interesting to study the OEM’s durability/quality
decision regarding his (proprietary) parts used in the products under such a threat.
Finally, we have assumed that the OEM is a monopolist in the primary market. While this
is a reasonable proxy for modeling particular market niches, there are many situations where
competition with other OEMs will decidedly shape an OEM’s decision. Regarding the optimal
proprietary content in the new product, such a case could arise when the IR can remanufacture
cores from different OEMs. In such a context, OEMs may even consider exclusivity clauses,
where an IR is authorized to remanufacture the OEM’s cores only if it does not remanufacture
any other OEM’s cores. A more detailed treatment of the effect of these complicating factors
on the OEM’s profitability presents another promising avenue for further research that could
provide additional insights into the optimal proprietariness decisions of the OEM.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We omit details of the proof here since it follows along the same lines as the proof for our
main model in Lemma 2 given below. Yet, the detailed exposition of the proof can of course be
obtained from the authors upon request.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We first show that the IR’s profit is concave in her decision variable pr. The profit function of
the IR is given by ΠIRprop(pr|pn, ws) = (pr − cr − ccqr)qr. The second derivative of this function
with respect to pr is
∂2ΠIRprop(pr|pn,ws)
∂2pr
= −2(cc+δ(1−δ))
(1−δ)2δ2 < 0. Thus, the optimal response of the
IR to the OEM’s decisions is given by the unique maximizer of the IR’s Lagrangean function,
which is given by LIR(pr, λ, λ2) = ΠIRprop(pr|pn, ws) − λ(qr − γqn) + λ2qr. Thus we get pr =
δ((1−δ)(1+δγ)λ−(1−δ)λ2+2ccpn+(1−δ)(cφ−βcφ+δpn)+ws−δws)
2(cc+δ(1−δ)) .
Next, we insert this result into the OEM profit function ΠOEMprop (pn, ws|pr) = (pn−cn)qn+(ws−
cp)qr− ξβν . To check the concavity of the OEM’s profit with respect to his decision variables pn
and ws we compute the Hessian matrix as H =
⎡
⎣−1− cc+δcc+δ(1−δ) δcc+δ(1−δ)
δ
cc+δ(1−δ) − 1cc+δ(1−δ)
⎤
⎦. The determinant
of the matrix is given by det[H] = 2cc+δ(1−δ) > 0, while the first leading minor is negative. Thus,
the OEM’s profit is jointly concave in his decision variables. Consequently, the OEM’s optimal
decisions are given by the unique maximizers of his profit function. We get pn =
1+cn
2 and
ws =
δ−λ−δγλ+λ2−cφ+βcφ+cp
2 = cp +
δ−c˜
2 +
λ2−λ−δγλ
2 . Now we only have to consider the four
possible cases resulting from the two constraints. The case where both constraints are binding,
i.e., qr = γ and qn = 0, can be excluded since it is not interesting when there is no production at
all. Moreover, this can only happen when cn ≥ 1, which we have ruled out by assumption. Then
we are left with the three described cases. Observe, first, that the price pn is independent of the
constraints. Thus we already have the proposed result. Now, let us start out with the partial
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remanufacturing case, i.e., the case where neither constraint is binding (λ = λ2 = 0). For this
case ws simplifies to ws = cp +
δ−c˜
2 , i.e., we have the proposed result. From the condition that,
in this case 0 < qr < γqn, we can readily obtain the two conditions δ ≥ c˜cn and c < c¯1, where
c¯1 =
2γ(cc+δ−δ2)
γ[(2cc+δ−δ2)(1+βψ)+δ(1−φ)(1−β)]+(1+βψ)δ−(1−β)φ−β(1+ψ) . The remaining prices and quantities
can readily be obtained by plugging in the values of pn and ws. Now let us move to the case
of no remanufacturing, i.e., 0 = qr < γqn. In this case, λ = 0 and λ2 > 0. Plugging these λs
into ws, then pn and ws into pr, and finally everything into qr and solving for qr = 0, we obtain
λ2 = c(β(1−φ+ψ−δψ)−δ+φ) = c˜−δcn. Since λ2 > 0 this yields δ < c˜cn . The remaining prices
and quantities can again readily be obtained by plugging in the values of λ2 and pn. Finally, the
third case, full remanufacturing, implies that 0 < qr = γqn, and consequently λ > 0 and λ2 = 0.
Using the same logic as in the no remanufacturing scenario, i.e., inserting these λs into ws, then
ws and pn into pr, and finally everything into qr and qn and solving the equation qr = γqn,
we obtain λ = c(2ccγ−φ+δ(1+γ(2−δ−φ)))−βc((1+δγ)(1−φ)+(1−2ccγ−δ(1+γ−δγ))ψ)−2(cc+δ(1−δ))γ
(1+δγ)2
. Inserting
λ into qr and rearranging the condition qr > 0, straightforward algebra yields the two bounds
δ ≥ c˜cn and c ≥ c¯1. Similarly, all the remaining prices and quantities can be computed. This
concludes the proof of Lemma 2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The OEM’s profits in the three cases derived in Lemma 2 are given by
• Case 1 (no remanufacturing): ΠOEMprop = (1−cn)
2
4 − ξβν
• Case 2 (partial remanufacturing): ΠOEMprop = (1−cn)
2
4 − ξβν + (δcn−c˜)
2
8(cc+δ(1−δ))
• Case 3 (full remanufacturing): ΠOEMprop = (1−cn)
2
4 − ξβν + γ
2(cc+δ(1−δ))(1−cn)2
2(1+δγ)2
.
Note that cn is strictly increasing in β. Thus, the first term is strictly decreasing in β in all
three cases. The second term, representing the design cost, is strictly increasing in β since ν ≥ 0.
Under partial remanufacturing, the first derivative of the third term (δcn−c˜)
2
8(cc+δ(1−δ)) with respect to
β is given by −c
2(1−φ+(1−δ)ψ)(δ−φ−β(1−φ+(1−δ)ψ))
4(cc+δ(1−δ)) . This term may be increasing in β. However,
it is straightforward to verify that, under the conditions required for partial remanufacturing, it
is in absolute terms always smaller than the first derivative of the first term (1−cn)
2
4 . Under full
remanufacturing, the third term is again strictly decreasing in β.
Consequently, in each case, the profit is strictly decreasing in β such that the optimal choice
for the OEM is always β∗ = βmin.
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From Lemma 2 we know that the OEM deters entry by the IR when δcn < c˜. Rewriting
this in terms of β we get β > δ−φ1−φ+(1−δ)ψ . Together with β
∗ = βmin, this implies that entry
deterrence is only optimal if βmin >
δ−φ
1−φ+(1−δ)ψ .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
From Lemmas 2 and 1 we know that the region in which the OEM deters entry by the IR is always
larger when there is proprietary content in the product. Thus, we now only need to compare the
profits for the no remanufacturing cases with and without proprietary parts. In the model with
proprietary parts, the OEM’s associated profit is given by ΠOEMprop =
(1−cn)2
4 −ξβν . Conversely, in
the model without proprietary parts, the OEM’s profit is given by ΠOEMgen =
(1−c)2
4 − δ
4(1−c)2
(8cc+8δ−6δ2)2 .
The OEM prefers introducing proprietary parts when ΠOEMprop > Π
OEM
gen . Inserting the profit
functions, rearranging for ξβν and then performing straightforward computations yield the pro-
posed result.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3
The logic of the proof follows along exactly the same lines as Lemma 2. The detailed exposition
can be obtained from the authors upon request.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma 2 we know that the OEM deters entry when δcn < c˜. Lemma 3 shows that the
OEM remanufactures when δ > φ. Putting these two results together we directly obtain that
the OEM will deter entry by the IR but remanufacture himself when φ < δ < c˜cn .
B Empirical evidence on the importance of the topic
In this session, we outline the evidence we collected through interviews carried out for a previous
project and from publicly available information. The issue of using proprietary parts spans entire
industries, such as those of personal computers, mobile phones, tractors, and washing machines.
“Surprising no one, the laptop is not very easy to open up and work on, and few
components will be easy for end users to replace. The battery is still glued in, and the
one system component that users can actually remove and replace – the SSD – is a
proprietary module that’s much different from the proprietary modules in MacBook
Airs and Pros from years past.” Source: Arstechnica, iFixit: New MacBook Pros
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are unsurprisingly difficult to repair and upgrade, URL: https://arstechnica.com/
gadgets/2016/11/ifixit-new-macbook-pros-are-unsurprisingly-difficult-to-
repair-and-upgrade/
“Lastly the use of proprietary screws and fixings, requiring specialised tools, po-
ses a great problem for disassembly if these are only available to the after sales ser-
vice providers of the manufacturers.” Source: Investigation into the repairability of
Domestic Washing Machines, Dishwashers and Fridges, URL: http://www.rreuse.
org/wp-content/uploads/RREUSE_Case_Studies_on_reparability_-_Final.pdf
“Fifty years ago, if your television broke you could bring it to the local electronics
shop to be repaired. These days, a broken TV likely means a trip to Best Buy for a
new one. [...] A growing number of people, seeing this as an unreasonable state of af-
fairs, are fighting back. In a so-called “right to repair” movement, this loose coalition
of consumer advocates, repair professionals and ordinary individuals are working to
create legislation that would make it harder for companies to keep repair information
proprietary.” Source: The Smithsonianmag, URL: https://www.smithsonianmag.
com/innovation/fight-right-repair-180959764/$#$dOdDZUJEcjR8P0WB.99
“Do you know where I can find further information on washing machine diagnosis
systems? [...] The manufacturers will not share!” Source: Personal communication
with the CEO of a large IR, 21 December 2012.
“The plan is to hook the laptop up to a gigantic John Deere combine, which,
like all farm equipment, has become increasingly difficult to repair as companies
have introduced new sensors and software into nearly every component.” Source:
Tractor-Hacking Farmers Are Leading a Revolt Against Big Tech’s Repair Mono-
polies, The Motherboard, Vice, URL: https://motherboard.vice.com/en$_$us/
article/kzp7ny/tractor-hacking-right-to-repair.
“AS DEVICES go, smartphones and tractors are on the opposite ends of the
spectrum. And an owner of a chain of mobile-device repair shops and a farmer of corn
and soyabeans do not usually have much in common. But Jason DeWater and Guy
Mills are upset for the same reason. ‘Even we can no longer fix the home button of an
iPhone,’ [...] Messrs DeWater and Mills have more and more company. It includes not
just fellow repairmen and farmers, but owners of all kinds of gear, including washing
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machines, coffee makers and even toys.” Source: A “right to repair” movement tools
up, The Economist, URL: https://www.economist.com/business/2017/09/30/a-
right-to-repair-movement-tools-up
“ Your shiny new iPad Pro is on the fritz. The touchscreen is cracked and isn’t
working properly. [...] Frustrated, you turn to Apple’s official support system. If
you didn’t purchase the company’s AppleCare+ warranty plan when you bought the
device, you find that replacing the screen will cost a whopping $599, plus shipping.
Or, you could buy an entirely new replacement from an Amazon vendor for $674.88.”
Source: Apple Is Fighting A Secret War To Keep You From Repairing Your Phone,
The Huffington Post, URL: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/apple-
right-to-repair$_$us$_$5755a6b4e4b0ed593f14fdea
“That made it far more difficult for home tinkerers to fix a laptop, a television,
or smartphone – let alone a car or farm tractor – making independent repair outfits
essential. Then manufacturers started using copyright laws to keep their repair
manuals offline, proprietary fasteners to seal their products, and in some cases, digital
rights management to protect their software.” Source: You bought that gadget, and
dammit, you should be able to fix it. Wired, URL: https://www.wired.com/2017/
03/right-to-repair-laws/
“On Monday, January 16th, Nikon Inc. sent a letter to independent camera repair
technicians in the US to say that ‘it will no longer make repair parts available for
purchase by repair facilities that have not been authorized by Nikon Inc. to perform
camera repairs.’ So after July 13, 2012, all Nikon repairs will be pushed through
Nikon’s own repair service or one of 22 Nikon authorized repair stations. Local,
independent camera repair shops will no longer be able to repair Nikon cameras with
manufacturer-approved parts. [...] Eliminating the supply of parts will devastate
many local repair shops – Nikon repairs make up a significant portion of their business
– and will make it significantly more difficult for photographers to get their Nikon
equipment fixed.” Source: How Nikon is killing camera repair. iFixit, URL: https:
//ifixit.org/blog/1349/
“The RAM, which even Apple usually concedes as a necessarily user-replaceable
part, is soldered to the MacBook Air’s logic board. This makes the online order
decision to upgrade from 2GB to 4GB a do-or-die moment.
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Overall, iFixit rated the Air a 4 out of 10 for serviceability. Many parts, like
the flash drive, fan, and WiFi chip, are held in by only a couple of screws. Howe-
ver, all parts are proprietary, not to mention barricaded by the five-point Security
Torx.” Source: iFixit finds MacBook Air full of pesky screws, proprietary parts,
Arstechnica, URL: https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2010/10/ifixit-finds-
macbook-air-full-of-pesky-screws-proprietary-parts/.
C Consumer surplus derivation
In line with the assumptions made when deriving the demand functions (5), we define the
consumer surplus to be the cumulative difference between a consumer’s willingness-to-pay for
the chosen product (new or remanufactured) and the corresponding price. The assumptions are
as follows (see, e.g., Debo et al. 2005, Oraiopoulos et al. 2012, Souza 2013): The willingness-
to-pay for new products θ is uniformly distributed among the consumers with support U [0, 1].
The willingness-to-pay for a remanufactured product is a constant fraction δ of that for a new
product, i.e., δθ. Thus, for any customer, the net utilities for buying a new, remanufactured, or
no product are Un = θ − pn, Ur = δθ − pr, Uz = 0, respectively, and consumer surplus (for a
standardized market size of 1) becomes
Υ =
∫ 1
0
max{Un, Ur, Uz} dθ
.Switching points for θ between not buying and buying remanufactured and between buying
remanufactured and new items, 0 ≤ θzr < θrn < 1 are given by θzr = prδ and θrn = pn−pr1−δ
(Abbey et al. 2017), and therefore consumer surplus becomes
Υ =
∫ 1
θrn
(θ − pn) dθ +
∫ θrn
θzr
(δθ − pr) dθ =
[
1
2
θ2 − pnθ
]1
θrn
+
[
δ
2
θ2 − prθ
]θrn
θzr
= qn
(
1− pn − qn
2
)
+
δq2r
2
. (15)
D Alternative competitive settings
D.1 Quantity competition
In this model variant, we keep the sequence of events but replace the price decisions with quantity
decisions, i.e.
1. Initially, the OEM decides on the proprietary content β of the product.
31
2. Then, the OEM decides on the wholesale price for proprietary spare parts ws as well as
on the quantity of new products qn to sell.
3. Finally, the IR decides on the quantity of remanufactured products qr.
Solving the quantity competition, we obtain the following results, structured analogously to
Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. Characteristics of the equilibrium regions for a fixed value of β are given in Table 11.
Given new production is profitable using proprietary parts, there exists a threshold value for the
marginal production cost of a new product, c¯Q1 , and the equilibrium regions can be described as
follows:
R1 If δcn < c˜, the IR does not enter the market and the OEM acts as a monopolist (no
remanufacturing).
R2 If δcn ≥ c˜ and c < c¯Q1 , the IR enters the market but does not remanufacture all available
cores (partial remanufacturing).
R3 If δcn ≥ c˜ and c ≥ c¯Q1 , the IR enters the market and remanufactures all available cores (full
remanufacturing).
Table 11: Equilibrium prices and quantities in all three strategy regions
Strategy R1 R2 R3
region no remanufacturing partial remanufacturing full remanufacturing
ws ≥ cp + δ(1−cn)2 cp + δ−c˜2 cp + (δ+2ccγ+2δγ)(1−cn)2(1+δγ)
pn
1+cn
2
1+cn
2
1+cn
2
pr n.a. δpn − δ(1−δ)(δcn−c˜)2(2cc+2δ−δ2) δpn −
γδ(1−δ)(1−cn)
2(1+δγ)
qn
1−cn
2
1−cn
2 − δ(δcn−c˜)2(2cc+2δ−δ2) 1−cn2 −
γδ(1−cn)
2(1+δγ)
qr 0
δcn−c˜
4(cc+δ(1−δ)) γqn
c¯Q1 =
(2cc+(2−δ)δ)γ
δ+2ccγ+2δγ−β(1+δγ)(1−φ)−(1+δγ)φ−β(1−δ−2ccγ−δγ)ψ
The proof of Lemma 4 follows along the same lines as the proof of Lemma 2 and is omitted
here. It can be obtained from the authors upon request.
These results confirm the structural similarity of the price and quantity competition models.
The bound for R1 (no remanufacturing) is identical to the bound in our original setting (see
Lemma 2). Comparing the thresholds c¯Q1 and c¯1 we find that c¯
Q
1 > c¯1. Thus, under quantity
competition, the region in which partial remanufacturing is optimal is larger.
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D.2 Simultaneous market price decisions
In this model variant, we move away from the Stackelberg setting and consider a situation where
the OEM and the IR set their market prices pn and pr simultaneously. The associated sequence
of events is as follows:
1. Initially, the OEM decides on the proprietary content β of the product.
2. Then, the OEM decides on the wholesale price for proprietary spare parts ws.
3. Finally, the OEM decides on the price for the new product pn, and the IR decides on the
price of remanufactured products pr.
Solving the third stage as a Nash game, we obtain the following results, structured analo-
gously to Lemma 2.
Lemma 5. Characteristics of the equilibrium regions for a fixed value of β are given in Table 12.
Given new production is profitable using proprietary parts, there exists a threshold value for the
marginal production cost of a new product, c¯N1 , and the equilibrium regions can be described as
follows:
R1 If δcn < c˜, the IR does not enter the market and the OEM acts as a monopolist (no
remanufacturing).
R2 If δcn ≥ c˜ and c < c¯N1 , the IR enters the market but does not remanufacture all available
cores (partial remanufacturing).
R3 If δcn ≥ c˜ and c ≥ c¯N1 , the IR enters the market and remanufactures all available cores (full
remanufacturing).
Table 12: Equilibrium prices and quantities in all three strategy regions
Strategy R1 R2 R3
region no remanufacturing partial remanufacturing full remanufacturing
ws ≥ cp + δ(1−cn)2 cp + δ−c˜2 −
(δcn−c˜)(2cc+δ(1−δ))2
2[(2cc+2−δ−δ2)2−4(1−δ2)(1−3δ)] cp +
δ(1−cn)
2
+
2(1−cn)(1−δ)(cc+δ(1−δ))γ
2cc(1+γ)+(1−δ)(2+δ+3δγ)
pn
1+cn
2
1+cn
2
+
(δcn−c˜)(1−δ)(2cc+δ(1−δ))
(2cc+2−δ−δ2)2−4(1−δ2)(1−3δ)
1+cn
2
+
(1−cn)(1−δ)(2cc+δ(1−δ))γ
2[2cc(1+γ)+(1−δ)(2+δ+3δγ)]
pr n.a. δ
1+cn
2
− 2δ(1−δ)2(δcn−c˜)
(2cc+2−δ−δ2)2−4(1−δ2)(1−3δ) δ
1+cn
2
− (1−cn)(1−δ)2δγ
2cc(1+γ)+(1−δ)(2+δ+3δγ)
qn
1−cn
2
1−cn
2
− (δcn−c˜)(2cc+3δ(1−δ))
(2cc+2−δ−δ2)2−4(1−δ2)(1−3δ)
1−cn
2
− (1−cn)(2cc+3δ(1−δ))γ
2[2cc(1+γ)+(1−δ)(2+δ+3δγ)]
qr 0
(δcn−c˜)(2cc+2−δ−δ2)
(2cc+2−δ−δ2)2−4(1−δ2)(1−3δ) γqn
c¯N1 =
(4c2c+(1−δ)2δ(8+δ)+4cc(2−δ(1+δ)))γ
(4c2c+(1−δ)2δ(8+δ)+4cc(2−δ(1+δ)))γ+2(2cc(1+γ)+(1−δ)(2+δ+3δγ))(δ−β(1−φ)−φ)−β(2cc+(1−δ)(2+δ))(2−2ccγ−δ(2+γ−δγ))ψ
The proof of Lemma 5 follows along the same lines as the proof of Lemma 2 and is omitted
here. It can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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These results confirm the structural similarity of the price and quantity competition models.
The bound for R1 (no remanufacturing) is identical to the bound in our original setting (see
Lemma 2). Comparing the thresholds c¯N1 and c¯1 we find that c¯
N
1 < c¯1. Thus, under simultaneous
market pricing decisions, the region in which partial remanufacturing is optimal is smaller.
To conclude, Figure 6 illustrates the variations in the strategy space implied by the different
types of competition, clearly highlighting the structural similarity of the results.
0  1
0
1

c
no remanufacturing
by IR
partial remanufacturing
by IR
full remanufacturing
by IR
0
Figure 6: Strategy regions in the case of an OEM using proprietary parts, under different types of
competition: Stackelberg price competition (bold), Stackelberg quantity competition (dashed),
Nash price competition (dotted)
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